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March 14, 2004

Comments

Jake Squid

Thank you. I think that it is extremely important to debunk the lies and falsehoods put forth as reasons to oppose SSM. It's the old, "If you say it often enough, everyone will believe it," tactic. We need to expose those falsehoods every time they are put forth. Thanks again.

Charles2

If it weren't so disturbing, it would be amusing watching opponents of Marriage Equality stumble around from excuse to excuse; the children! procreation! the bible! end of civilization! end of marriage! the children!

They will do anything to avoid discussing this as an equal rights/equal protection issue. How difficult can it be to understand that "all laws will apply to all people all the time?" Unfortunately, distractions seem to work with the public.

Jake Squid

I'm not sure that it's so much that "They will do anything to avoid discussing this as an equal rights/equal protection issue." as it is that they are desperately trying to justify their prejudice to themselves & others. Or to justify their religious beliefs as having validity outside of faith. And as a way to convince people who are undecided or not strong in their opinions that their is factual evidence that SSM will do harm.

K

It's amazing how we can ignore the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence and the entire Civil Rights movement in the name of religion. Isn't the first tenant of Christianity "Do unto others as you would have done to you" or did we forget that part?

The link to the Kmiec's op-ed is no longer valid and I don't recall having read it in the first place, but Galois has commented on specific bits. So to those bits I'll add the following...

>>"People take on many duties and obligations when they marry. Procreation is not one of them. So same-sex couples are indeed asking to take on--and capable of fulfilling--the same duties and obligations as other couples."

Kmiec's acknowledged that, "Marriage has purposes besides procreation, but many are aimed at supporting it." Galois, you did not respond directly to this. Instead you seemed to say that there were more important purposes of marriage of which none supported procreation.

It may be that this subset of secondary purposes is more central to same-sex couples as a general rule. And such couples with children may represent an exception that fits within the new SSU (same-sex union) template. But sharing some secondary aspects of marriage does not make same-sex union the equivalent of marriage.

On a societal level, it is reasonable for the state to acknowledge that procreation is a central purpose of civil marriage. There is a societal interest in the transmission of human life and culture; and in our society that is primarily expressed in the context of the procreative model of marriage.

chairm

Galois said,

>>"Professor Kmiec claims it doesn't matter because these [childless] couples are exceptions. Does he really think same-sex marriage will become the rule? I don't know how many same-sex couples there are, nor how many will marry, but I'm fairly certain they will be a minority of all marriages. I'm guessing there will be less same-sex marriages than marriages of infertile opposite-sex couples."

Kmiec referred to childless married couples as exceptions to a general rule by which marriage is presumed to be the locus of conceiving and raising the next generation. [There are other central purposes of marriage that support procreation.] Kmiec suggested that it would be unwise to legislate on marriage based on exceptions. By this I take it he meant that it is better to start with a good general rule and then deal with the instances that vary from that rule without overturning the rule. I may be mistaken, but I think he meant that homosexual couples contradict the rule, while childless married couples are exceptions.

The inability to procreate would be an exception among married couples; it is the general rule among SSU couples. That has less to do with childlessness and more to do with the combination, or lack of combination, of the sexes. That is demonstrated when the vast majority of children who reside in same-sex households are the children of previously procreative marriages.

Your countered with examples of exceptions that make marriage *easier* for some couples, as compared to the man-woman criterion that makes marriage impossible for all same-sex couples. I think that these are good examples of *apparent* exceptions to the procreative model that actually, on closer inspection, test the model and, thus, confirm it.

>>"the three day waiting period is waived when the death of either party is imminent. In that exceptional circumstance ... procreation is certainly not the basis ... "

The waiting period provided an automatic caution for couples entering a lifetime commitment. Somehow, in the face of certain death, the delay doesn't seem to be as instructive nor as valid. This exception is not an automatic as it requires "extraordinary or emergency" circumstances, imminent death, an "authoritative request" from a religious official or an attending physician, and the approval of the court. If granted, the waiver wouldn't make marriage *easier*, just available sooner for someone at death's door. [How long before this becomes a dead parrot parody? Heh.] Think of a woman who might be at great risk in giving birth; or a fatally injured man whose bethrothed was already pregnant with his child. Besides compassion, this regulation might clear the way for solutions to actual problems in dire circumstances.

You have mistakenly portrayed a slight change in timing as the equivalent of a major contradiction of the eligibility criteria. The procreative model is not overturned by the selective grant of a waiver on the waiting period.

>>"In Arizona and a few other states certain couples can marry only if they are incapable of procreation. Why again should they be able to marry, but not same-sex couples?"

In this example, first-cousins are expressly excepted from the prohibition on the general category of closely-related couples. That prohibition originates with concerns about possible harm to potential offspring; and with the concern that state-approval might lead to harmful relations within families. The exception of first-cousins actually adds, rather than removes, requirements. The prohibition and this exception is very much based on the procreative model of marriage.

lucia

I have edited Chairm:

Kmiec referred to childless married couples as exceptions to a general rule by which marriage is presumed to be the locus of conceiving and raising the next generation. I may be mistaken, but I think he meant that homosexual couples contradict the rule, while childless married couples are exceptions.

Prof. Kmiec may very well mean what you say. If so, Prof. Kmiec's logic is flawed.

Extension of marriage to childless infertile couples contradicts the rule. Their marriage cannot logically be about conceiving or raising the next generation of children.

Prof. Kmiec's argument is this:
1) He simply guesses that 'X' is a rule.
2) He tests the rule against evidence.
3) He finds tons of evidence that 'X' is not the rule.
4) He admits evidence that exists supports the alternative rule "Z".
5) However, he dislikes "Z" because it would permit something he wishes to outlaw, while X would permit us to ban it.
6) He claims: evidence to suggest 'X' is not the rule should be called 'exceptions'. They show that the rule is even stronger! Those things which I wish to prohibit will be called 'contradictions'.
7) He continues to insist 'X' is the rule.


Prof. Kmiec's desire to insist that evidence that contradicts his theory supports his theory leads to a tortured, non convincing, irrational sounding argument.

chairm

>>"I'm curious as to how the studies managed to trace the risks to the absence of a mother or father as opposed to the absence of a parent. One would think that at least part of the risk would come from the problem of single parenting itself, and hence we might have some interest in helping couples stay together."

There appears to be little utility in swapping mother and father with "parent". Parents are not genderless and that is significant in the experience of children. Having two of the same gender (more of the same) might be a help in terms of financial support or freeing up one parent to spend more time with the children, but that turns out to be a secondary feature of a mom and dad team.

I agree that encouraging prospective parents to marry is a very good idea; encourgaing married couples to find the ways to keep their families intact and successful, is probably an even better idea. In both instances, the utility of the procreative model is evident and it already exists as the normative ideal in our society.

The nascent template of SSU may yet emerge as a normative ideal in the homosexual community. Time will tell. Society, through government, currently acknowledges and elevates the nongovernmental institution of marriage (the state did not create it) with the procreative model at its heart; and perhaps in time there will be a popular and proven SSU model to acknowledge as well. There may be dangers in legislating SSU into existence rather than allowing time and space for it to emerge with its own deep validation. The court-based conflation of SSU and marriage is an unjust imposition and a significant social mistake, I think.

>>"Marriages don't end when the procreation ends. Most of the laws of marriage deal with aspects other than procreation. The list goes on."

Your reasoning would lead to the insistence that if same-sex couples are unmarriagable, then, the state should coercively dissolve the marital status of couples who no longer procreate?

More generously, perhaps you mean that given the ineligibility of same-sex couples, couples who are beyond childbearing years ought to be ineligible to enter marriage anew?

In any case, declaring a narrow and misleading equivalence between same-sex couples and childless married couples appears to confuse exceptions with contradictions.

[I'll post more on that in the other thread where we began a discussion last week.]

chairm

>>"Same-sex couples are already raising children in California, and so the quesiton is should these children be denied the protections marriage could give their families. Professor Kmiec avoids this vital question."

By far most of the children residing in same-sex households are children of divorce and as such they already have both a birthfather and a birthmother. These children have the same potential protections that are provided for other children of divorced parents and single parents.

In the case of either assisted reproduction or adoption (both representing a tiny percentage of children in our society) unmarriagable parents went out of their way to bring a child into a home without either a father or a mother. As single moms and dads they have access to societal assistance -- adoptive parents increasingly so.

An individual's choice to raise a particular child does not now dictate that same-sex couples become eligible to marry. The vital question might be why someone might design a fatherless or motherless home for a child (especially newborns and very young children). Hopefully the reason would be to provide the best available alternative that would serve the best interests of this or that particular child. In my experience, I'd say that adoption agencies and adoptive parents (straight or gay, single or married) sincerely strive to fullfill this concept to their utmost.

The issue of adoption really should not be used to promote nor to demote same-sex union.

chairm

>>"Extension of marriage to childless infertile couples contradicts the rule. Their marriage cannot logically be about conceiving or raising the next generation of children."

There is no extension of marriage. Men and women marry each other. The procreative model is not narrowly about the outcome of the procreative act. So infertile couples do not contract the general rule.

Kmiec did not guess that marriage is where procreation is best encouraged and where it most commonly occurs. Where is the tons of evidence that this is not so?

I'm not sure what you mean by "alternative rule". Same sex couples are not outlawed. The state recognizes marriage. Same sex union contradicts the procreative model at the heart of marriage.

When a general rule is tested, and is not overturned, it is confirmed. To insist otherwise is illogical and not the rational basis for changing the social institution of marriage.

chairm

Oops, I meant to say, "So infertile couples do not contradict the general rule."

Galois

Kmiec's acknowledged that, "Marriage has purposes besides procreation, but many are aimed at supporting it." Galois, you did not respond directly to this. Instead you seemed to say that there were more important purposes of marriage of which none supported procreation.

I thought I did respond to it. The other purposes of marriage are not only to support procreation. (In fact, I would argue that they are not even primarily about procreation, but that is not relevant). As long as there are other purposes of marriage, there are reasons for infertile couples (including same-sex couples) to marry. Certainly it does no harm to recognize the fact that every couple has their own reasons for marrying. We need one uniform set of laws for marriage, but as long as each couple follows those laws, their individual reasons for marrying are irrelevant to the state.

On a societal level, it is reasonable for the state to acknowledge that procreation is a central purpose of civil marriage.

That's fine, but what is wrong with acknowledging other purposes as well. It's not like same-sex couples marrying are going to prevent another married couple from procreating.

The inability to procreate would be an exception among married couples; it is the general rule among SSU couples.

No. Once same-sex couples are allowed to marry the inability to procreate would still be an exception among married couples. (Unless you believe most people would prefer to marry someone of the same sex). You can say it is the general rule among same-sex couples, but it is also the general rule among couples in their sixties. Why don't we need to forbid such elderly couples from marrying so they don't destroy marriage?

You have mistakenly portrayed a slight change in timing as the equivalent of a major contradiction of the eligibility criteria. The procreative model is not overturned by the selective grant of a waiver on the waiting period.

But just the fact that they are eligible to marry, marks the contradiction. Again why is elderly couples marrying an "exception that tests the rule", but same-sex couples marrying something that "overturns the procreative model"? You say allowing someone on their deathbed to marry might present a solution to an actual problem. That problem, though, is not the inability to procreate. I have shown that same-sex marriages would provide solutions to a number of a problems. Why, in that case, must we develop a whole new system, but the deathbed couple can use marriage?

The prohibition and this exception is very much based on the procreative model of marriage.

The exception certainly shows that not only are there other reasons for marriage, it is perfectly acceptable to acknowledge such reasons. Why is it okay to acknowledge these other reasons for first cousins, but not for same-sex couples? Is is clear that it is okay to make exceptions to your rule "married couples must procreate", so why can't we make an exception for same-sex couples?

Galois

I think Lucia pretty much covers it with her breakdown, especially point (6). So I will ask you, Chairm, some questions that perhaps will help

1) What is the "general rule" to which you refer for which infertile couples are excpetions unless they are of the same sex in which case they are contradictions?

2) If something does not follow this rule how do we know whether it is an "exception" or a "contradiction"?

3) How do you determine whether someone is "male" or "female"? Must everybody be classified as one or the other?

4) Is it okay to marry for reasons other than a desire to procreate?

5) Do you believe marriage helps to keep couples together?

lucia

I agree Gabriel, my point 6 encapsulates the key flaw in Kmiec's argument.

I think Chairm was trying to address 6 when she advanced this statement:

When a general rule is tested, and is not overturned, it is confirmed.

I could quibble with the use of the word rule rather than hypothesis in this case, and whether or not the statement is correct. However, neither quibble matters.

Chairm: I am saying is this:
Your general rule has been tested against the observable data (or evidence). The observable data (or evidence) contradict the rule. Therefor, the rule is overturned!

Possibly, if you answer Gabriel's questions 1-5, particularly 1, 2 & 3, we can begin to understand how or why the data describing valid marraiges do not contradict your "procreative rule."

chairm

>>"Your general rule has been tested against the observable data (or evidence). The observable data (or evidence) contradict the rule. Therefor, the rule is overturned!"

I think you are mistaking exceptions to the regulations that touch the edges of marriage with the exceptions to the procreative model which is at the heart of marriage. For instance, the age requirements vary from state to state, but the presumption remains that a man marries a woman. That's an example of a variable feature of marriage.

To change that to two men or two women would replace the procreative model with the same-sex template, which is expressly non-procreative. That would overturn a central feature -- and purpose -- of marriage.

I realize that Galois has posted elsewhere that he doesn't believe that SSU is a substitute for marriage and that little will be changed should the reform be enacted in our society. But I think that is incorrect. And it is obvious that we are coming at this issue from very different perspectives; and there is only so much that can be said in a handful of posts. I'll consider the questions and attempt to frame a response that moves us along more productively. ;-)


Galois,

>>"But just the fact that they are eligible to marry, marks the contradiction. ... You say allowing someone on their deathbed to marry might present a solution to an actual problem. That problem, though, is not the inability to procreate. ... Why, in that case, must we develop a whole new system, but the deathbed couple can use marriage?"

This became an apparent exception to the model when it was mistakenly assumed that the waiver had something to do with a supposed inability to procreate.

The waiver is limited to the waiting period where a couple is otherwise eligible to marry. It is an exception in timing. No new system is needed. This is an example that tests and confirms the procreative model as per the examples posted earlier.

>>"Why is it okay to acknowledge these other reasons for first cousins, but not for same-sex couples?"

Superficially, this may appear to be an exception to the procreative paradigm because the requirement prevents the couple from making babies together.

But the provision is a specific exception to the prohibition on closely-related couples. First-cousins are fairly distant but the purpose of this additional requirement is to reduce the perceived risk of causing harm to children (and to familial relationships). In so doing, the state acknowledged that married couples tend to create progeny and, thus, the state confirmed the procreative model.

Only one of the individuals in such a couple is required to become certifiably sterile; nowadays, the other could conceive or induce conception through assisted reproduction.

Both of your examples merely appear to test the general rule but on closer inspection, the procreative model is confirmed. Same-sex couples remain ineligible.

>>"You can say it is the general rule among same-sex couples, but it is also the general rule among couples in their sixties. Why don't we need to forbid such elderly couples from marrying so they don't destroy marriage?"

Galois, I still owe you a more extensive discussion on elderly infertile couples, but I've been busy on a project with a looming deadline -- (IOW: doing my *real* work. Heh.) And I'll first hafta go through the posts of the last few days. Sorry for the delay.


Lucia and Galois, I still owe a more extensive discussion on these various points. I haven't read Ben's commentary on infertile couples yet so I'll hafta to see what may be left for me to add. Anyway, I'll try to return this weekend to pick up where I'm leaving off.

Might even bring poetry...


PS: Ben, has your commentary been posted yet at marriagedebate? I haven't seen it.

chairm

My typo: "Both of your **examples merely test the general rule** and on closer inspection, the procreative model is confirmed. Same-sex couples remain ineligible."

Galois

This became an apparent exception to the model when it was mistakenly assumed that the waiver had something to do with a supposed inability to procreate.

My point was not that they got a waiver because they couldn't procreate. Rather it was that they were allowed to marry despite of the fact that they won't be procreating (or at least not with the intent of keeping the father and mother together after the birth). The waiver is important because it shows this couldn't simply be a legislative oversight. The legislature clearly considered this situation. Likewise same-sex couples are not asking to marry because they can't procreate, but rather despite of that fact.

nowadays, the other could conceive or induce conception through assisted reproduction.

Just as with same-sex marriage. By this theory, same-sex couples test the rule, but the procreative model is still confirmed.

Galois, I still owe you a more extensive discussion on elderly infertile couples.

I eagerly await it. I'm still trying to figure out when something tests the rule and when it overturns it.

lucia

Rather it was that they were allowed to marry despite of the fact that they won't be procreating (or at least not with the intent of keeping the father and mother together after the birth).

But this leaves the question: why not provide the waiver to any and all couples who won't be procreating? What is the criteria for denying one non-procreating couple waiver and granting it to another?

If we were discussing something else, like building permits or business licenses, the same type of question arises. How do you decide who gets a waiver and who is denied a waiver?

lucia

Might even bring poetry...

Haiku:

We ask for the rule.
The rulemaker is silent;
he can't describe it.

Galois

Lucia,

The waiver here is in reference to waiving the three day waiting period requirement. The idea is if someone is about to die you don't want to have to wait three days to marry. The fact that they are allowed to marry at all, though, does raise the question of when can an "exception" be made.

lucia

Ahh! I thought chairm was refering back to granting permission for cousins marry. I should have scrolled back.

chairm

But before I embark on this series of Sundary morning posts, here's a joke:

An optimist, pessimist, and SSM advocate arrive at a public debate and take their places at the table on stage. There's one glass of water on the table.

The pessimist says, "This glass is half empty." The optimist says, "This glass is half full." The SSM advocate says, "This glass is twice as large as it needs to be."

chairm

The discussion here has been impressively analytical and though-provoking so, first, I want to commend you for your blog and the amount of effort that you have put into your discourse. There are some points still dangling in regard to the waiting period waiver and the kissing cousins waiver, and other bits and piece to which I'd be happy to return later. But this morning... infertility.

In addressing infertility there is a biological aspect but more importantly a cultural aspect. Humanity depends on culture in place of raw instinct. The core of marriage is comprised of a set of universal purposes -- what I've referred to as the procreative model. But the model is not narrowly defined solely by the *outcome* of the procreative act, or sexual intercourse between a man and a woman. Near the end of my posting I'll touch on 5-6 central purposes of marriage as illustrated by the apparent exception of the elderly couple. This will not be a legalistic argument. But neither is it a case for biological determinism. I draw more from sociology and anthropology. This is the context for other points elsewhere in the discussion about this or that marriage law or reglation or right.

By now you may have detected an affinity I have toward commentators such as Paul Nathanson, Katherine K. Young, Stanley Kurtz, and Margaret Somerville. Also, my religious faith (orthodox Catholicism) profoundly informs my views which, in discussions of marriage, I try my best to describe in secular terms.

And with the preliminaries out of the way, I'll get back on topic....

chairm

Galois and Lucia, you have asked about the elderly man and elderly woman who have become incapable of childbearing and yet are still eligible to marry. [Thanks for your patience.]

Such an elderly couple is not infertile. Niether are same-sex couples infertile. Not in the normal sense as applied to men and women who might be expected to be fertile.

Infertility is a relatively rare medical condition for which about 1.2-2% of couples seek treatment. It is an impairment of the capability to have a child as demonstrated after at least a year of unprotected sexual intercourse between a man and a woman of childbearing age. (Some would extend the timeframe to two years.) What this means for a married infertile man and woman is that despite their strong desires and best efforts, they remain childless. Medically, their condition is treated as a disease that often can be cured or reversed.

Old age is not a disease nor can it be cured. The diminished procreative power in the elderly couple's relationship is due to a medical condition best described as "getting old". They travel down a universal one-way path in life.

Same-sex couples are not said to be suffering from a disease that impairs their capability to procreate together. Their impediment is a matter of human physiology, not infertility in the sense that a man and women together may be said to be infertile. The elderly couple's sexual intercourse *becomes* non-procreative. For that there is no medical treatment, no cure.

In contrast, the intercourse of all same-sex couples begins and ends as non-procreative; their sameness would remain unchanged through the latter stages of their lifes together in same-sex union.

chairm

The analogy of a same-sex couple and an elderly man and woman is apparent but misleading. The same-sex couple is representative of the universal condition of an entire category of couples regardless of age. The elderly couple are a subgroup within the larger man-woman category -- by virtue of their age, not of their procreative capability. To equate them seems mistaken.

Two persons of the same sex represent sameness and are comparable to one person alone. Like a solitary individual, both same-sex partners might be capable individually of either conceiving or inducing conception. But not without the opposite sex.

The binary nature of marriage is not in the quantitative restriction to two persons, but in the qualitative advantage of no less than one person of each sex. Individually, members of a same-sex couple may be potentially advantaged but as a union they are disadvantaged with certitude. They do not constitute an infertile couple; they are sterile as a couple and as sterile as an individual acting alone. This sameness also affects childrearing; and it contradicts the procreative model. Same-sex couples (whether homosexual or not) comprise a category outside the normative model.

In our society, the childbearing age of women correlates with the period in life in which women marry men. I don't have the stats handy but something like 93% of all adult women have children; and more than 95% of all Americans eventually marry sometime in the their lifes.

Sex between men and women generally includes the chance of impregnation even with near-perfect use of the most reliable contraceptives. The high degree of human intervention needed to avoid having children while also having conjugal sex is a near-universal fact of married life. Within the large category of man-woman couples, there are exceptions to this aspect of marriage; but these are not contradictions of the procreative model. That applies to the elderly married couple.

But not with couples in same-sex union.

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